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Abstract 
 
Current infrastructure network models of single functionality do not typically 
account for the interdependent nature of infrastructure networks.  Infrastructure networks 
are generally modeled individually, as an isolated network or with minimal recognition of 
interactions.  This research develops a methodology to model the individual infrastructure 
network types while explicitly modeling their interconnected effects.  The result is a 
formulation built with two sets of variables (the original set to model infrastructure 
characteristics and an additional set representing cuts of interdependent elements).  This 
formulation is decomposed by variable type using Benders’ Partitioning and solved to 
optimality using a Benders’ Partitioning algorithm.   
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I.  Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
The President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) defines 
infrastructures as  
[A] network of independent, mostly privately-owned, manmade systems and 
processes that function collaboratively and synergistically to produce and 
distribute a continuous flow of essential goods and services (President’s 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997: 3).   
 
In addition to the national infrastructures necessary for the public good, the Department 
of Defense also utilizes multiple interrelated infrastructures.  While many of these 
networks are synonymous with those already listed in PCCIP, others are uniquely 
military.  A comparison of perspectives developed by Tom Bozek (2002:3), Office of the 
Secretary Defense, is provided in Figure 1. 
• Telecommunications
• Energy
• Water systems
• Transportation
• Banking and Finance
• Emergency Services
• Government Operations
• Global Information Grid
• Public Works
• Public Works
• Transportation
• Financial Services
• Emergency Services
• Command, Control & Communications
• Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reconnaissance
• Personnel
• Space
• Logistics
• Health
U.S. Federal Perspective U.S. DoD Perspective
 
Figure 1.  United States Infrastructures 
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 Just as the United States depends on infrastructure networks for survival, potential 
adversaries of the United States also depend on their infrastructure networks.  Because of 
these dependencies, infrastructure networks have been studied extensively to identify and 
locate vulnerabilities, bottlenecks, and other problem areas.  Once identified, measures 
can be taken to mitigate vulnerabilities in our own infrastructures, while building 
doctrine, methodologies, and techniques to exploit vulnerabilities in our foe’s networks.  
In an increasingly interconnected and complex world, these vulnerabilities may span 
several infrastructures, possibly located in multiple countries.   
 Because of the size and complexity of individual infrastructures, these networks 
are typically modeled individually.  History shows, however, that interdependent and 
cascading effects can potentially have unexpected results completely outside any 
predicted (and sometimes desired) consequence.  In a study conducted by Hauer (1999) 
for the Department of Energy, eleven major cascading power failures were analyzed - 
most were traced back to a single trigger.  For example, the 1965 blackout throughout the 
northeast was caused by a single relay switch in Ontario (Hauer, 1999:  5).  Ideally, such 
effects would be captured in any model of these interrelated networks, and captured 
without having a significant impact on usability or running time of the model. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 Current infrastructure network models of single functionality do not typically 
account for the interdependent nature of infrastructure networks.  Infrastructure networks 
are generally modeled individually, as an isolated network or with minimal recognition of 
interactions.  In part, this is because one large model of all infrastructure networks, even 
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if it existed, would be too complex to effectively manipulate and analyze in most 
operational time frames.  No model currently exists in the open literature to include 
effects from individual infrastructure network types while accounting for interdependent 
effects across network types.  This research develops a methodology to model the 
individual infrastructure network types while explicitly modeling their interconnected 
effects.   
1.3 Problem Approach 
Inadequate modeling of interdependent networks results in unforeseen events 
which can cost lives and weaponry in military applications.  To model the individual 
networks along with their interdependencies, an additional set of variables is added to the 
infrastructure network models.  These binary variables represent whether or not a set of 
interdependent network elements are removed from the network.  The result is a 
formulation built with two sets of variables (the original set to model infrastructure 
characteristics and an additional set representing cuts of interdependent elements).  This 
formulation is decomposed by variable type using Benders’ Partitioning and solved to 
optimality using a Benders’ Partitioning algorithm.   
 The approach is based on large scale optimization methods.  The overall problem 
of modeling infrastructure networks and their interdependencies is decomposed into the 
individual network types, while overlapping effects are isolated in a separate problem.  
This approach leverages information and techniques that have been developed for 
modeling individual infrastructure networks, while accounting for coupling effects.   
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1.4 Assumptions  
 The overriding assumption of the proposed model is that either a cost or benefit is 
defined for each element (i.e. nodes and arcs in a graph) in the model.  These numbers are 
dependent on the use, mission, and desired output of the model.  Developing effective 
multicriteria measures of performance for infrastructure networks is a major research 
effort in and of itself.  While such an effort is outside the scope of this thesis, the 
modeling approach utilized here can be adapted to any additive resource that conforms to 
the assumptions of linear programming.  This area has been extensively researched at the 
Air Force Institute of Technology (see Pinkstaff (2001), Leinhart (1998), Renfro (2001), 
among others).    
1.5  Summary 
Current infrastructure network models do not typically account for the 
interdependent nature of such networks.  Infrastructure networks are generally modeled 
individually in isolation.  The size and complexity of these models prohibit modeling all 
infrastructures as a single network.   
 This approach is demonstrated on a set of four notional networks.  The networks 
presented are small so the methodology can be easily followed, but as stated previously, 
the intended applications of this approach are very large networks for which other 
approaches are neither practical nor desirable.  Chapter two provides a review of the 
literature to form the foundation for the work done in this area.  Chapter three discusses 
the proposed methodology and procedure which is then demonstrated in Chapter four.  
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The last chapter presents a set of improvements and extensions that can be made to this 
methodology.   
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II.  Literature Review 
 This chapter defines terms and concepts relevant to this research effort.  Key 
concepts and ideas from the literature are presented.  Finally, background information on 
the systems under analysis is presented. 
2.1 Infrastructures 
 
Our national defense, economic prosperity, and quality of life has long depended 
on the essential services that underpin our society.  These critical 
infrastructures—energy, banking and finance, transportation, vital human 
services, and telecommunications—must be viewed in a new context in the 
Information Age.  The rapid proliferation and integration of telecommunications 
and computer systems have connected infrastructures to one another in a complex 
network of interdependence (PCCIP, 1997, ix). 
 
To select targets of a physical infrastructure, first a general understanding of how each 
infrastructure functions is required.  Therefore, a brief description of infrastructure layers 
is provided. 
2.1.1 Information and Communications 
 
The “information and communications infrastructure [consists] of the Public 
Telecommunications Network (PTN), the Internet, and the many millions of computers in 
home, commercial, academic, and government use”  (PCCIP, 1997: 4).   
2.1.1.1 Telephone 
 To provide an understanding of telephone networks, the following is a summary 
of detailed explanations taken from http://www.howstuffworks.com.  Telephones use 
copper wires to transmit signals to/from the telephone itself directly to a local telephone 
switch or to a digitizer.  Digitizers convert incoming analog signals to digital signals so 
2-2 
they can be combined and sent to the local switch with a much smaller subset of wires 
(copper, fiber optic or coaxial cable).  Local switches connect local calls to the 
destination and connect long distance calls to the appropriate long distance switch. 
 To determine the appropriate long distance switch for a given signal, computers at 
the local switch find the incoming signal’s phone number in a database and determine the 
selected long distance provider.  Long distance switches route calls though a series of 
long distance switches connected by fiber-optic lines, satellite, microwave towers, and 
undersea cables, and finally to the local switch in the area of the destination of the call 
which then completes the call to the selected number.   
 Cellular communications work in much the same way.  The main difference is 
that signals are sent though the air to the closest tower which connects to a Mobile 
Telephone Switching Office (MTSO).  The MTSO acts as a local coordinator between 
the cellular towers and connects to a local switch as necessary.   
 Both traditional phone systems and cellular phones are vulnerable to attack.  
“When exploiting a telecommunications system, the campaign planner must choose one 
of three attack methods—physical, jamming, or spoofing” (Hurst, 1993: 23).  The first 
method is physical attack where “system redundancy, centralization of key nodes, and 
hardness and location of those nodes will determine the resources required to obtain the 
desired system degradation from physical attack” (Hurst, 1993: 24).  Depending on the 
desired effect, physical destruction presents a broad range of options.  On one end, a 
Special Forces unit can use wire clippers to cut the phone line into a building.  On the 
other end of the spectrum, physical destruction can be bombing local/long distance 
switches covering the area desired. 
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 Although not physically destroying links or nodes, jamming also “focuses 
resources on particular links, messages, or time periods in order to have increased 
effectiveness in disrupting the network as a whole” (Hurst, 1993: 30).  Wireless 
communications such as satellite communications, microwave transmissions, and even 
cell phone calls are exceptionally vulnerable to jamming.   
 Spoofing injects false information directly into a network.  Spoofing changes the 
information that the infrastructure relies on.  Both traditional and cell phones can be 
spoofed, as they rely on databases to carry out their functions.  For example, if the cell 
phone database for particular cell(s) were accessible, the attacker could locate what cell 
phones are inside particular cells, and then corrupt the database making the cell phone(s) 
unusable (Hurst, 1993: 30). 
 In addition, areas outside the telecommunications system could be targeted to 
affect communications service.  For example, every element of the telecommunications 
infrastructure requires electricity to function.  Some components, such as local switches, 
have battery or generator backups; however, they can only function for a limited time and 
are themselves dependent on other infrastructures functioning correctly. 
2.1.1.2 Internet 
 In simple terms, the Internet is a network of computer networks.  There are 
several high-level networks connecting to each other through Network Access Points 
(NAPs).  Computers connect to an internet service provider (ISP) and become part of the 
networks.  Routers join networks together at these NAPs, passing information from one 
network to the other, as necessary.  Routers also protect the networks from one another, 
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preventing the traffic on one from unnecessarily spilling over to the other 
(http://www.howstuffworks.com/internet-infrastructure.htm). 
 Every machine on the Internet has a unique identifying number, called an internet 
protocol address, or IP Address.  Every time a domain name is used, the Internet's 
domain name system (DNS) server translates the human-readable domain name into the 
machine-readable IP address.  Routers need this information to pass requests and 
information.  There are multiple DNS servers at every level to serve as backups as 
systems fail.   
 Much like telecommunications, the Internet is subject to physical attack, 
jamming, and spoofing.  Certainly, routers and backbones can be physically attacked.  
Denial of Service attacks effectively “jam” targeted IP addresses.  Finally, since Internet 
routers do not verify accuracy of information passed to them, they can be spoofed to 
direct traffic in a desired direction.  “Most vulnerable are the interconnection points 
between major ISPs, where there are no grounds at all for rejecting route advertisements”    
(Schneider, 1998:  20).   
 The dependency of the Internet on other infrastructures is clear.  Every 
component requires electricity, and at times, the internet and telecommunications are 
inseparable.  Both dial-up and DSL internet connections use telephone components for 
their connection.  In addition, telephones can use internet components during the 
completion of a call.   
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2.1.2 Energy 
 
 “The electrical power infrastructure consists of generation, transmission, and 
distribution systems that are essential to all other infrastructures and every aspect of our 
economy”(PCCIP, 1997:  4).  The following is a summary based on 
http://www.howstuffworks.com.  This site explores how the electrical infrastructure 
works from a non-technical point of view. 
Electricity is produced by power plants using spinning electrical generators.  In 
hydroelectric dams, a water wheel spins the generator.  However, most power plants use 
steam produced by burning coal, oil, natural gas, or nuclear reactors to turn the generator.     
 Electricity leaves the generator and enters a transmission substation at the power 
plant.  There, transformers convert the generator’s voltage into much higher voltages for 
transmission on the transmission grid.  Transmission lines are long distance transmission 
lines which are interconnected permitting the interchange of electricity between utilities.    
 These transmission lines also connect to power substations which step-down the 
voltage to “distribution” voltages.  These distribution lines carry electricity to drum 
transformers immediately before entering homes and businesses.  Power substations 
typically include safeguards which allow for the disconnection of the substation from the 
transmission grid, or separate distribution lines if necessary to help prevent cascading 
electrical failures.   
 Control centers offer an additional measure to monitor and control power 
distribution.  Control centers collect data from remote terminal units (RTUs) which, in 
turn, collect data from field instruments and equipment.  Control centers monitor and 
control these units and the power grid itself though Supervisory Control and Data 
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Acquisition (SCADA) systems.  SCADA systems collect electric system data from the 
field, initiate alarms, and issue control commands to the field as directed by the 
applications in the control center system (The President's National Security 
Telecommunications Advisory Committee (PNSTAC), 1997:  6). 
 Although much emphasis has been placed on the vulnerabilities of the electric 
infrastructure to non-kinetic means of attack, “physical destruction is still the greatest 
threat facing the electric power infrastructure,” (PNSTAC, 1997:  6).   
Attacking the generation portion of an electrical system is attractive for several 
reasons.  First, it eliminates the power at the source, spreading the impact of 
electrical outages to a large number of users.  Second, the generators and turbines 
are vulnerable to damage by bombing and are not easily replaced (Griffith, 1994:  
6).  
 
These generating plants are large, easy to find, and expensive and time consuming to fix.  
Of particular concern are nuclear power plants.  An attack on a nuclear facility could 
potentially disperse radioactive material throughout the local atmosphere and ground 
water supply.   
 Step-up transformers are also vulnerable to physical attack.  These transformers 
are generally in open areas, easily identifiable, and not well guarded.   The advantage to 
attacking transformers is that they are each unique, specifically designed for the varying 
voltages and physical arrangements.  Consequently, the transformers are often custom 
made, and there is not usually a large number of spares available (Griffith, 1994:  7). 
 In addition, although not traditionally vulnerable, the power lines themselves can 
be targets.  According to Aviation Week & Space Technology, the US Air Force has used 
CBU-94 bombs that eject spools of specially-treated carbon-graphite wire which unravel 
into a web shape as they near the ground.  The scattered reels drape over power lines 
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shorting them out, causing flash fires, and large explosions.  This results in power surges 
which open power plant circuit breakers, and shut off the distribution of electricity.  
Alternatively, the shells can be filled with small fibers which float down and engulf a 
target, disabling everything electronic.  “The fibers, measured in thousandths of an inch, 
are even pulled through cooling fans into the interior of electronic equipment where they 
cause arcing and shorting.”  In addition, because of their small size, they are virtually 
impossible to completely clean out (Fulghum, 1999: 34-35). 
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons can also be used to physically attack the 
electric infrastructure.  EMPs cause a large spike in voltage which destroys all electrical 
components, including those in a generator and/or transformer.   Even areas not affected 
by the initial pulse could collapse from the “late-time EMP effect.”  The late-time EMP 
effect occurs about 15 minutes after detonation:  EMP surges through electrical systems 
create localized magnetic fields.  When these magnetic fields collapse, electricity surges 
through the power and telecommunication infrastructure.  Therefore, heavily guarded 
sites, such as telephone switching centers and electronic funds-transfer exchanges, could 
be attacked through their electric and telecommunication connections (Wilson, 2001: 1). 
 Substations are also vulnerable to electronic attack.  Both digital breakers and 
RTUs can be dialed into from any telephone connection.   
By dialing into a port on a digital breaker, a utility engineer can reset the device 
or select any of six levels of protection.  An electronic intruder who could identify 
the telephone line serving such a device could dial into an unprotected port and 
reset the breaker to a higher level of tolerance than the device being protected by 
the breaker can withstand.  By doing this, it would be possible to physically 
destroy a given piece of equipment within a substation.  The intruder could also 
set the device to be more sensitive than conditions for normal operations and 
cause the system to shut down for self-protection (PNSTAC, 1997:  6). 
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 The communication systems the electric utilities rely on are also vulnerable to 
electronic attack.   
“Utilities rely on a mix of private microwave radio, private fiber, and public 
networks for communications among control systems elements.  Any one of these 
mediums could be exploited in an electronic attack.  In most cases, an attack on 
the communications infrastructure alone would constitute a nuisance attack,” 
(PNSTAC, 1997:  6). 
 
Clearly, there are a number of ways to attack the electrical infrastructure of a nation.   
 
2.1.3 Vital Human Services 
 
2.1.3.1 Water Supply 
 “The water supply infrastructure assures a steady flow of water for agriculture, 
industry (including various manufacturing processes, power generation and cooling), 
business, firefighting, and our homes,” (PCCIP, 1997:  4).  In many cases, water supplies 
not used for drinking (i.e. agriculture and industry) come from outside the public water 
supply system; being drawn by the users directly from surface or ground sources," (Ryan, 
1998:  14-15). 
 Drinking water itself comes from a variety of sources:  rivers, lakes, reservoirs, or 
pumped from aquifers.  Depending on the community and source of the water supply, the 
water is subject to some or all of the following to remove contaminants:  filtration, 
flocculation and sedimentation, and disinfection.  Filtration involves a series of filters 
used to remove suspended particles such as clay, silts, organic matter, and precipitants 
from other treatment processes.  Flocculation and sedimentation combine the smaller 
particles which settle out as sediment.  Finally, the water is disinfected before it is 
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distributed.  Disinfection is typically done by treating the water with chlorine, 
chloramines, or chlorine dioxides (EPA, 2002: 1). 
Once the water is treated, it is sent to a community via a distribution network of 
buried pipes.  Most communities make use of water towers which store water at higher 
elevations than the community it serves.  From there, gravity maintains a constant 
pressure on the water network as the main pumping force.  Smaller pipes, called house 
service lines, are attached to the distribution water lines to bring water from the 
distribution network into homes and businesses (EPA, 2002:  2). 
 Once the water is used, it is collected and sent to a wastewater treatment facility.  
Usually these plants are located in low-lying areas to allow gravity to bring the water to 
the facility.  Pipes from each building flow to a sewer main.  The sewer main consists of 
a series of pipes which get progressively larger until the treatment plant is reached.  In 
areas where gravity alone cannot force the flow toward the treatment plant, grinder-
pumps or lift stations are used to move the sewage along 
(http://www.howstuffworks.com). 
 Once the water reaches the wastewater treatment plant, it usually goes through 
three stages of treatment.  The first stage, known as “primary treatment,” allows solids to 
settle out of the water and the scum to rise.  All the solid material is collected and 
disposed.  The second stage, known as “secondary treatment,” removes organic materials 
and nutrients.  Water flows to large, aerated tanks where bacteria consume additional 
waste. The wastewater then flows to settling tanks where the bacteria settle out.  The 
third stage, known as “tertiary treatment,” uses chemicals to remove phosphorous and 
nitrogen from the water, and may also include filter beds and other types of treatment. 
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Lastly, chlorine is added to the water to kill any remaining bacteria before it is discharged 
into a river, ocean, or other body of water.  (http://www.howstuffworks.com) 
Supply interruptions can be caused by numerous acts, including physical 
destruction.  For instance, "one city has six giant pumps, and they're all in one building.  
If you crashed an airplane into that building or blew it up, it would cause half a million 
people to lose their water supply almost instantly.  Pumps of this size must be custom-
built and can take as long as 18 months to replace," (Isenberg, 2001: 1).   
Water towers also make large, vulnerable targets.  They tend to serve smaller 
areas which may be important if the desired goal is to isolate a small subset of a 
population or strike at a particular military, governmental, or industrial complex.  Simple 
loss of pressure can aggravate an ongoing emergency such as a fire or decontamination 
operations.   
Supply interruptions can also occur as an indirect result of contamination.  
Although not a tactic (weapon) used by western governments, it is typical of terrorist 
organizations/states.  For that reason, it is included here for completeness.  In his recent 
report, Deininger listed five potential sites for contamination (Deininger, 2000:  16).  
Each of these sites has an associated probability of success (i.e. not diluted or killed by 
chlorine).  In addition, each potential contaminate has its own associated “benefits” and 
risks.  All of these factors must be weighed along with the associated desired effect to 
determine how an attacker plans to disrupt water supply.   
The first potential site for contamination is upstream from the intake of a water 
supply system.  A second option is to insert contaminants near the intake of the treatment 
plant.  Third, a contaminant can be placed in service reservoirs.  Service reservoirs are 
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usually accessible by manholes and ventilation ducts.  A fourth possibility is to insert the 
contaminant at some point in the distribution system.  For example, a water truck can 
hook up to a fire hydrant, overcome the pressure, and inject the contents of the tank; 
thereby easily contaminating an entire street or subdivision.  The last point of insertion 
considered by Deininger was at individual house connections (Deininger, 2000:  16-20).  
Water flow can be reversed using simple devices such as vacuum cleaners or bicycle 
pumps.  The resulting backflow would push the contaminant into the local water 
distribution system (Isenberg, 2002, 1-2).  If these were done in several places nearly 
simultaneously, it could create the appearance of a large scale attack (Deininger, 2000:  
18). 
In addition to physical attacks, supply can also be interrupted as a result of 
interruption of SCADA systems.  These systems monitor and control water pressure, 
flow, and dam operations.  Again, depending on the desired effect, SCADA systems 
could potentially be used to achieve the desired goals.  For an extensive discussion 
explaining SCADAs in water systems, see Ezell (1998) and Ezell et al (2001).  In 
addition to the SCADA dependence on the telecommunications infrastructure, water 
systems also need energy to power pumps and treatment facilities. 
2.1.3.2 Government Services 
  The purpose and scope of government is a hotly debated item.  However, 
according to our values, a key mission of governments is to provide the necessary 
functions outlined in the Preamble to the Constitution such as establishing justice, 
ensuring domestic tranquility, providing for the common defense, promoting the general 
welfare, and securing the blessings of liberty (Ryan, 1998:  15).  To disrupt these 
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functions, the leadership can be targeted, directly, through physical attack, or indirectly.  
Indirect targeting can include isolating leadership communications such that the leaders 
are unable to send messages/orders.  In addition, government records (such as the Social 
Security or Medicare systems) could be attacked potentially affecting millions, spoofing 
the public and causing panic.     
2.1.3.3 Emergency Services 
 "This infrastructure includes firefighting, police, rescue, and emergency medical 
services. Its objectives are to contain and deal with emergencies in order to save lives and 
preserve property,” (Ryan, 1998:  15).  These areas are rarely targeted directly; however, 
they typically become crippled due to attacks on other infrastructures on which they 
depend.  For example, downed transportation bridges, jammed telecommunications, or 
power outages critical to operations make emergency services’ functions difficult to 
maintain.  Secondary explosions timed to attack first responders are a direct attack.  The 
disruption of governmental or emergency services can spread panic.  These services 
depend on communication and logistics and a continual disruption can cause widespread 
problems.   
 
2.1.4 Physical Distribution 
 
Transportation makes it possible for materials to be moved to processing centers, 
for finished products to be moved to market, for commodities essential to 
transportation and to production and marketing to be distributed as necessary, and 
for the population to move to and from work and other commercial activities.  
Transportation also supports the activities of the Department of Defense and other 
governmental functions (PCCIP, 1997:  2).   
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This infrastructure supports both passenger and freight transportation.  Physical 
distribution includes highways, pipelines, railroads, ports and waterways, civil aviation, 
mass transit, and “vehicles” that use these facilities.   
In addition to the roads themselves, highways include tunnels, bridges, and 
trucked hazardous materials.  Pipelines include control systems, pumping stations, above-
ground pipes, river crossings, control centers, and storage facilities.  Railroads include 
train control systems, rails, switches, bridges, trestles, rail hazardous material, intercity 
passenger, and control centers.  Ports and waterways include locks, dams, cargo vessels, 
passenger vessels, and terminals.  Civil aviation includes planes, airports, and air traffic 
control components.  Finally, mass transit includes tunnels, stations, trains and buses, 
train control system, and control centers. 
Disruption to critical links in the transportation system provides an opportunity to 
cause serious economic harm. Therefore, transportation facilities may be targets of 
terrorists intending to harm the economy (Polzin, 2002:  2).  “Terrorists may be 
motivated to cause personal injury to concentrations of people. Transportation facilities 
often provide anonymous gathering places for large numbers of individuals (Polzin, 
2002:  2).   
To study attacks on the transportation infrastructure, the US Department of 
Transportation conducted a vulnerability assessment.  Included in this study were 
potential targets grouped by types of weapons used.  The target and weapon used will 
depend on the desired effect.  The table is reproduced as a summary of potential 
target/weapon combinations. 
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Figure 2.  Transportation Attacks 
Many types of attacks on the transportation sector would not cause a significant 
disruption on a national scale, serious economic harm, or public danger.  However, the 
wide variety of possible attacks could be symbolic and frighten people from traveling, 
especially using mass transit.  Although not a direct national threat, the combination of 
vulnerability and symbolism of local attacks make the transportation sector a likely 
target.   
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2.1.5 Banking and Finance 
 
 "The banking and finance infrastructure was defined by the Commission as 
composed of five principal sectors: banks, financial service companies, payment systems, 
investment companies, and securities and commodities exchanges," (Ryan, 1998:  14). 
 Often attacked for financial gain, the financial sector has the most advanced 
defenses of all industry sectors.  However, they are not invulnerable.  High visibility 
targets in this sector could be physically attacked for symbolic/psychological reasons.  
Financial markets are sensitive to these events.  For example, an attack in Manhattan 
could potentially cause a crash in the stock market, causing cascading effects into other 
sectors.  The terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001, closed Wall Street for 
days, bringing most trading to a stop on those exchanges.  Once the markets did open, 
they immediately plummeted.  Psychological operations could also be used against a 
target population to create instability in the targeted area.  Consider the national 
dependence on ATMs.  An attack that crippled these systems would not only 
inconvenience millions, it would affect economic vitality and consumer confidence.   
Other vulnerabilities include the economic dependence on electronic transfers.  
Western economies are not set up to smoothly function on a cash basis.  Disruption of 
electronic transfer would disrupt the entire economy.  Another potentially crippling effect 
would be a large scale identity theft.  The economy is built on trust that identity can be 
verified by some means.  These examples are only the tip of the iceberg for the havoc that 
could result from an attack on the financial sector. 
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2.2 Infrastructure Interdependencies 
 
 As mentioned previously, each infrastructure is dependent on some or all of the 
others in order to function properly.  A thorough study into these interdependencies was 
conducted by Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001).    
 There are four types of interdependencies:  physical, cyber, geographic, and 
logical.  An infrastructure is physically dependant on another infrastructure if it requires 
material produced by another.  For example, most power plants rely on the transportation 
sector for delivery of its fuel.  Without transportation into the power plant, no electricity 
can be produced.   Cyber dependency occurs when the state of an infrastructure is 
dependent on information sent though the information infrastructure.  Both energy and 
water (vital human services) infrastructures depend heavily on the use of SCADA 
systems.  Infrastructures are geographically interdependent if their immediate 
environment is the same.  For example, if energy and telecommunications lines are 
attached to a bridge, both would be affected if the bridge is destroyed.  Lastly, logical 
dependencies are those relationships between infrastructures not included in the other 
categories (Rinaldi, 2001: 14-16). 
 When targeting an infrastructure component, the decision must be made as to the 
level of damage necessary to obtain the desired end effect.  This is referred to as the 
“state of operation.”   “Conceptually, the state of operation of an infrastructure can range 
from optimal design operation to complete failure” (Rinaldi, 2001: 21).  Typically, the 
desired effect of targeting an infrastructure is to disrupt, degrade, or destroy the targeted 
components.   
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 If complete failure is the desired effect, this can be accomplished via a variety of 
means.  Multiple infrastructure failures can interact via cascades, escalations, or common 
causes.  Cascading failures are failures in one infrastructure that cause failures in a 
second infrastructure.  Escalating disruptions are the result of a disruption in one 
infrastructure which intensifies an independent disruption of a second infrastructure.  A 
common cause disruption is one in which two or more infrastructures are disrupted at the 
same time because of a common cause (Rinaldi, 2001: 22).  While cascading or 
escalation effects are desirable in some settings, they have the potential to cause 
undesired collateral damage in other settings.   
 To predict the effects of targeting an infrastructural component, one must be able 
to determine the impact across all infrastructures.  This will depend on the degree of 
coupling, type of coupling, and adaptability to change of multiple infrastructures.  Tightly 
coupled systems have little slack in their connecting links, whereas loosely coupled 
systems can often accommodate failures by adapting.  “Numerous factors contribute to 
adaptability, including the availability and number of substitutes for critical processes or 
products, workarounds and contingency plans, backup systems, training and educational 
programs for operational personnel, and even human ingenuity in the face of disasters,”  
(Rinaldi, 2001: 20).  The type of coupling refers to either a linear coupling or more 
complex coupling.  Linear coupling can be visualized as an assembly-line effect, where 
each effect has a preceding cause.  Complex couplings are more subtle and often involve 
effects not easily explained or understood. 
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2.3  Targeting  
 
Air Force doctrine describes two broad approaches to target analysis:  target 
system analysis and critical node analysis.  Target system analysis looks at individual 
targets to determine their vulnerabilities and how these vulnerabilities can be exploited.  
It compares the effects of attacking the system through various means to determine which 
method will most likely achieve the desired effect on the targeted system.  This requires a 
thorough knowledge of how the targeted system works - its capabilities, limitations, and 
interactions.  Combined with knowledge of various weapon effects, targeteers decide the 
best method to neutralize the target based on the needs of the mission (AF Pamphlet 14-
210, 1998: 41). 
Critical node analysis considers interdependent relationships among multiple 
target systems.  This analysis considers potential cascading effects as well as effects 
across multiple systems of an adversary.  In other words, critical node analysis looks at a 
network of target systems (along with potentially non-targeted systems).  “The objective 
is to determine the most effective way to influence or affect enemy systems” (AF 
Pamphlet 14-210, 1998: 42). 
AF Pamphlet 14-210 also covers specific characteristics of targets which should 
be taken into account when selecting targets.  These elements are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1.  Target Selection (AF Pamphlet 14-210, 1998: 48-51) 
Importance and Significance  
Depth 
Reserves 
Cushion 
     --Process and equipment substitutes 
     --Product or service substitutes 
     --Availability of substitute supplies and services 
Capacity 
Product or Service Economic Value  
Vulnerability 
Reconstitution or Recuperability 
     --Type of Installation 
     --Availability of Repair Materials 
     --Similarity and Interchangeability of parts 
     --Importance and significance to the enemy 
Geographic Location 
      -Target Location 
Concentration or Dispersal 
     --Mobility 
Countermeasures 
 
The relative importance of each characteristic depends on the nature of the mission and 
objectives.  Selecting targets based on these characteristics is a function of experience, 
values, and to the extent possible, quantifiable objectives.  Of course, some of these 
characteristics are more quantifiable than others.   
For example, suppose planners wish to evaluate the desirability of bombing a 
power plant.  Obviously electricity is vital to modern society and military applications.  
Power plants are clearly vulnerability to physical attack because of their size and inability 
to relocate.  Most have only minimal stockpiles of fuel to guard against supply 
interruptions, and there are few alternatives to users when electricity is interrupted.  
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However, the transmission grid protects against small-scale attacks by redirecting power 
from unaffected plants.  Due to the uniqueness of each power plant, repair times for 
individual plants cause long term shortages from which the grid may have difficulty 
recovering.   
In addition to target characteristics, the effects of candidate weapons against 
targeted systems must also be considered.  The following effects are taken from the 
research paper co-authored by 23 students at the Air Command and Staff College at 
Maxwell AFB, AL., “Information Warfare: An Opportunity For Modern Warfare.” 
Table 2.  Weapon Effects 
Corruption Changing the content of information. 
Deception Changing information to portray a situation different from reality.  
Delay Slowing the flow, acquisition, and dissemination of knowledge. 
Denial Prevention of the flow, acquisition, and dissemination of knowledge.  
Disruption The reduction of the capacity to provide and/or process information. 
Degradation The permanent reduction in the capacity to provide and/or process 
information. 
Destruction The destruction of information before it can be transmitted.   
 
To illustrate, suppose a telephone switch is the potential target to be evaluated.  
Obviously, physical destruction of the building is still an option.  However, if an 
information attack is considered, the characteristics in the table “Weapon Effects” 
describe the attack.  For example, the database of long distance carriers can be corrupted, 
causing telephone calls rerouted to incorrect destinations.  The switch could be flooded 
with false traffic, preventing or reducing the flow of calls through the switch.   
Lastly, attributes of using a particular weapon against a particular target must also 
be considered.  Table 3 is a list of potential attributes: 
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Table 3.  Weapon Attributes (AF Pamphlet 14-210, 1998: 88-89) 
Persistency Length of time weapon will affect the target. 
Speed Length of time necessary to achieve desired weapon effect. 
Latency Ability to lie dormant until needed. 
Reversibility Ability of weapon effects to be reversed. 
Fratricide Adverse affects on friendly weapon systems. 
Collateral Damage Undesired affects possible though use of weapon against 
target. 
Stealth Ability to stay hidden from enemy.  
Mutual Interference Interference of using weapons on other weapons/goals.  
 
Target characteristics, effects, and attributes are combined to select potential targets and 
evaluate weapons to be applied to these candidate targets.  Referring to the previous 
telephone switch example, these characteristics allow the comparison of options such as 
physical destruction or information attack.  Physical attacks are fast, long lasting, and 
irreversible.  Other factors such as collateral damage and fratricide are highly dependent 
on local environments and factors.  An information attack relies on stealth, can remain 
dormant until activated, and generally have low chances of collateral damage.  However, 
these weapons are generally untested which may (or may not) lead to unforeseen effects.   
2.4  Effects Based Operations 
 
 Until recently, operations were planned and executed in multiple stages with little 
or no overlap between the specialized areas.  Target classes were chosen by decision 
makers, specific targets were selected by targeteers, weaponeers optimized weapons 
against the targets, and mission planners planned the execution of bombs on target.  
However, a process is taking hold which is referred to as “effects based operations 
(EBO).” 
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In their October 2001 White Paper, the J9 Concepts Department defined EBO as, 
“a process for obtaining a desired strategic outcome or ‘effect’ on the enemy through the 
synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military 
capabilities at all levels of conflict.”  The stove-piped specializations are replaced by a 
continuous five stage process as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first step is to gain an understanding of capabilities, objectives, the adversary 
(or potential adversary), and the environment.  With this knowledge, an informed 
decision about desired effects and means to achieve them are planned.  When ordered, the 
plan is executed, and information is collected and analyzed to determine the success or 
failure of the mission.  This information is then rolled into adjustments needed for the 
adaptation and assessment of future planning and missions (Uchida, 2002: 2).   EBO is 
Figure 3:  Effects Based Operations (Uchida, 2002: 2) 
Plan for effects,
emphasizing strategy-
to-task linkage
Execute plan,
considering full
range of 
capabilities
Adjust
course
of action
Assessment
Application
Knowledge Effects
Adaptation
Develop comprehensive
insight into adversary,
environment and self
Assess impact
of effects
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becoming a key element in targeting.  To properly exploit EBOs use, interrelated effects 
must be considered.   
To demonstrate this philosophy, the example of the telephone switch developed in 
Section 2.3 can be expanded.  Previously, specific telephone switches would be selected 
as targets based on specified criteria, weaponeers would then decide the best way to 
attack the target.  Effects based operations first approaches the problem by asking what 
the desired outcome of an attack is.  If the goal is to disrupt telephone service to a local 
community for an extended period of time, then the method to achieve this goal will be 
significantly different than if the goal is to block one building from receiving calls for a 
short amount of time.  The best solution to the first problem is probably putting bombs on 
target.  The second problem offers different options, such as those available by 
information attack. 
2.5 Network Flow 
 
 Network flow modeling, a subset of linear programming, have special structures 
which allow larger problems to be solved in less time than more general linear 
programming would allow.  Exploiting this network structure allows problems to be 
analyzed that often could not otherwise be solved in a reasonable amount of time via 
other mathematical programming methods.  Since many real world systems can be 
modeled as networks, a great deal of work has gone into developing analytical techniques 
in dealing with networks.   
Most network analysis is based on flow through the system.  Examples of 
analytical techniques include finding the maximum flow of a commodity through a 
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network and minimizing the cost of the flow through a network subject to demands.  
Other techniques, investigate the structure of the network itself.  For example, algorithms 
can identify the shortest path through a network or a minimum spanning tree of a 
network.   
Infrastructure analysis uses many of these ideas and algorithms.  In the 
completion of a telephone call, the switch calculates a shortest path from the caller to the 
called.  If that path is blocked or busy, the next shortest path is calculated.  This process 
is carried out until a path is completed.  Water and electric power flow can be viewed as a 
form of minimum cost flow.  This thesis research is based on disrupting these networks.  
Specifically, a network analysis technique called s-t cut sets is used.  Ideally, the 
disruption of these networks would be done at minimum cost.  For more information on 
network theory, algorithms, and applications, see Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin (1993).   
2.6  Isolation Sets 
 
In the network isolation algorithm, the goal is to partition a network into r sets of 
distinguished nodes at minimum cost.  These r sets of nodes are those to be isolated from 
one another (Bellmore, 1970: 461-469). 
The algorithm described here takes advantage of node partitioning properties to 
find the set J.  Therefore, the formulation is modified slightly.  Here, a cost is assigned to 
inter-network arcs with nodes in separate partitions.  To develop this formulation, 
distinguished nodes are first assigned to their separate partitions as follows: 
,
1 if  partition  of network 
( )
0 otherwise
i
i j i
x j i
xπ
∈
= 

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All nodes must be assigned to a partition, so the sum across all partitions of a 
network for each node must be equal to 1.  
1)(
1
, =∑
=
r
j
iji xπ  for i=1 to k 
 If costs are to be assigned to arcs which span multiple networks, there must be a 
way to determine when this occurs.  This is done via the following equation: 
0),(),()()( ,,,, =−+− yxyxyx jijijiji δγππ  
     where    )(, xjiπ    ),(, yxjiγ  ),(, yxjiδ    are 0-1 variables 
the ),(, yxjiγ  and ),(, yxjiδ are variables used to ensure the balance.  For more 
information, see Bellmore (1970) 
 The jth subproblem is 
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   ( ),   ( , ), ( , ) 0j j jx x y x yπ γ δ ≥  
where ( )xσ is the simplex multiplier corresponding to each constraint in the master 
problem for the free nodes (i.e., ,ix R∉ i=1, 2, . . ., r), and ( )xσ =0 for the fixed nodes 
(i.e., 
r
i=1
ix  R∈∪ ).  (Bellmore, 1970: 461-469) (Bennington, 1969) 
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2.7 Decomposition Methods 
 
One method for dealing with “large” problems is to decompose them into smaller 
more manageable parts.  These subproblems are managed by a “master problem” which 
combines the subproblem solutions to find an optimal solution to the overall problem.  
Ideally, the large problem decomposes into subproblems which have structure which can 
be exploited to quickly generate solutions.   
Dantzig and Wolfe in their 1961 paper developed a technique which exploits 
block angular structures of continuous linear programs (Dantzig, 1961).  Baumol and 
Fabian demonstrated how the steps of the Dantzig-Wolfe algorithm can be interpreted as 
an economic model for managing a distributed decision making system (Baumol, 1964).  
In addition, Sweeney and Murphy developed a similar method to solve large scale integer 
problems (Sweeney, 1979). 
Benders in his 1962 paper Partitioning Procedures for Solving Mixed-Variables 
Programming Problems presented a procedure for solving mixed-variable programs.  
Benders takes a problem of the form 
max{ ( ) | ( ) , , }T pc x f y Ax F y b x R y S+ + ≤ ∈ ∈  
and partitions it into two mutually exclusive subsets which are solved separately.  One set 
consists only of the continuous variables (i.e. the x’s) with all the other variables fixed at 
some value.  Either this problem is solved directly, or the dual is solved, and the dual 
variable values are passed to the “master” problem.   This master problem then solves for 
the new y’s which are again fixed for the other partition(s).  This technique has also been 
extended to solve nonlinear problems (Geoffrion, 1972:  237). 
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 Chapter 2 has reviewed the background relevant to approaching the multilayered 
network analysis.  This background serves as the basis for the methodology outlined in 
Chapter 3 and illustrated in Chapter 4. 
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III.  Methodology 
 
 This chapter develops the methodology used in this research.  It provides a step in 
modeling and analyzing effects between infrastructure networks.  The information in this 
chapter should allow the reader to duplicate and modify this research to model 
multilayered networks with interdependent elements. 
3.1 Modeling Approach 
 
 The intended use of the methodology presented here is on multiple infrastructure 
networks which have overlapping or common components.  Although developed for 
infrastructure networks, this approach is general enough to be appropriate for any set of 
multiple network models with common elements.   
 The approach developed here is robust enough to work with a variety of different 
objectives.  Chapter Two introduced several types of analysis appropriate for network 
models.  Any of these types of network analysis could be utilized with the methodology 
presented here for layered networks.  For example, network algorithms such as those for 
finding maximum flow, minimum cost flow, minimum cost disconnecting sets, isolation 
set, or any other applications across a single network can be used in conjunction with the 
partition approach outlined provided commonalities can be defined.  The method in this 
thesis extends these and other applications across layered networks. 
 Additional elements required for implementation depend on the purpose(s) of 
analyzing the networks.  If flow across the networks is a consideration, then at a 
minimum, upper and lower capacities of each arc of the networks must be specified.  In 
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addition, if cost and/or benefits are considered in the objective, then these must also be 
specified.     
 While the goal of the methodology presented here is to extend network algorithms 
across multiple interdependent layers, the approach leverages the valuable information 
gained from implementing algorithms across a single layer.  To build on the foundation 
of these algorithms, the majority of conventions and notations developed here mimic the 
single layered case as much as possible.   
3.2 Model Description 
 
Each network is modeled as a directed graph G=[N, A] where N is the set of 
nodes and A is the set of arcs creating the network topology.     
G=[N, A] where A {( , ) : , N}i j i j⊆ ∈  
The requirement that the networks be directed is nonrestrictive, as any undirected arc can 
be replaced with two directed arcs with opposite orientations.  It is noted, however, that 
such an approach does increase the problem size.  Without loss of generality, each 
network contains a source node, which supplies flow, and a sink node, which requests 
flow.   
In general, a cost or benefit is associated with each arc.  For applications which do 
not consider cost or benefit, this requirement can be ignored.   Depending on the mission, 
a benefit (target values, for example) may be substituted for cost.  Although only arcs 
have a cost or benefit by assumption, this is not a restrictive assumption.  Variations that 
allow for both nodes and edges to be considered could be implemented in a 
straightforward way:  every node represented is replaced with two nodes, say u and v, in 
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which there is an arc (u, v) and an arc (v, u); removal of either of these arcs is equivalent 
to removing the corresponding node.  However, this increases the size of the network as 
the number of nodes is doubled and the same number of arcs is added to the model.  Of 
course, codes which deal with nodes directly can also be utilized. 
 The variable xij is defined as the flow across an arc from node i to node j.  There is 
some upper limit on the capacity of individual arcs, denoted uij,  
    ( , )ij ijx for each i j Aµ≤ ∈ . 
Lower capacities are assumed to be zero.  Again, this is not a restrictive assumption, as 
any nonnegative lower bound can be substituted out:   
   0   ( , )ijx for each i j A≥ ∈ . 
In addition, flow into each node must equal the flow out of each node, except for the 
source and sink nodes:   
:( , ) :( , )
0 for all {   }ij ji
j i j A j j i A
x x i N s and t−
∈ ∈
= ∈ −∑ ∑  
 
The objective function for each network will depend on the mission.   This notation and 
formulation works well for single layered networks.  In fact, if the node labeling is 
unique across all networks, then the above notation will also work for multiple networks.  
Alternatively, a subscript could be added to each variable to indicate what network to 
which it belongs, xijk. 
However, nothing in the single layered network formulation specially accounts 
for commonalities from other networks.  These “commonalities” may be a shared 
corridor or effect.  For example, a bridge might support road/rail traffic as well as power 
and telecommunications.  This common corridor would be modeled as an arc in each 
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individual network.  A kinetic attack that destroys the bridge would sever the arc in each 
of the respective networks.  On the other hand, an EMP attack may only affect the power 
and telecommunication networks, thus effecting some, but not all of the elements in the 
common corridor.  Finally, a specific attack by the SOF team on only the road and rail 
lines without significant collateral damage would only affect those networks.  
Alternatively, an attack on one link of a network may have desired effects in another 
network.  The effect would impact multiple networks, and hence should be modeled 
affecting the appropriate networks.    
 Let I be a node or arc(s) with common interdependencies across k networks.  I has 
common elements in all layers of the K networks of interest, or in some subset of the 
layers.  Let W1 be the set of all effects options, w, which can be applied to the elements in 
I.  The option w may affect all the elements in I or it may affect a subset of I.  Consider 
the example above, I=1 is the bridge carrying road, rail, power and telecommunication 
lines.  There different options were outlined, so W1={1, 2, 3}. 
For the set W1: 
 w=1 Effects-based option 1 affects all networks 
 w=2 Effects-based option 2 affects only power and telecommunications 
 w=3 Effects-based option 3 affects only road and rail 
 
where w=1 was the kinetic attack, w=2 is the EMP weapon and w=3 was a SOF team 
attack on the road and rail. 
 Associated with each option against a particular interdependent element is the 
actual effect.  For a given I and Iw W∈ , let 
ki
δ  be the change (effect) on node i of 
network k given the selection of Iw W∈ .  In addition, define ijkδ to be the change (effect) 
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on arc (i,j) of network k given the selection of Iw W∈ .  If there is no actual effect,
ki
δ  or 
ijkδ  would be zero for the particular combination.  On the other hand, affecting a node 
could also affect a number of arcs.  In general, for some Iw W∈  
1
1
Nodes
     
Arcs
k
I
k
i
i
w W
ij
ij
δ
δ
δ
δ
δ
∈
 
 
 
      =         
 
 
  
 
 Finally, for a given Iw W∈ , assume yw=1 if option w is selected and zero 
otherwise.  It is assumed that one would not wish to double strike a target (at least in 
planning) so, at most, one of the common attack options w is selected.  Therefore, the 
regularity constraints  
1     for all 
I
w
w W
y I C
∈
≤ ∈∑  
where C is the set of all commonalities I, would generally apply.   
Consider the following development, based on the minimum cost flow problem to 
illustrate the modeling.  Given an A matrix of network flow, with right-hand sides b, flow 
over arcs, x, is limited by the capacity, µ . For a single network 
TMin  
s.t.   A =
         
∂
≤
x
x b
x µ
 
which may be rewritten as 
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T           Min  
A
=
s.t.     
I
∂
   
   
   ≤
      
x
b
x
µ
 
If there are K multiple layered networks, each individual network k K∈  may be written 
with the subscript identifying the network. 
T
k
k
             Min                                               k Networks Model
A
=
s.t.     
I
k k
k
k
k
∂
  
  
   ≤
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b
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To incorporate the interdependent effects and their costs, the vector of costs associated 
with the interdependent costs Iw W∈ , we , of some option for all I is defined as 
1 2[ , , , ]me e e=  
and with the costs associated with the individual networks defined by 
1 2[ , , , ]
T T T T
K= ∂ ∂ ∂C  
 
Figure 4.  Commonalities Model 
Now, the formulation across multiple layers is  
a/       5/     ...a,...     a/     c^ 
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If Benders’ partitioning is applied to this problem, the x variables break into independent 
subproblem networks given a fixed vector, y .  The y variables problem can be expressed 
as a minimization of the original objective function coefficients, CT, and the maximum of 
the extreme points associated with the feasible regions of the duals, lν , of each of the 
subproblem networks at iteration l. 
{ }min     max  ( )
. .
          0,      1, ,
          0
l
T l
l
C y b y
s t
l L
ν
ν
ν
+ −∂
≥ =
≥y
…
 
where 1 2( ) [( ), ( ), , ( )]
l l l l
kν ν ν ν=  which gives the master problem 
                                                       min                                          SP
s.t.     ( ) ( )  for  = 1, 2, . . ., 
                                1  r 
T l l l
z
z y b y b y l rν ν ν≥ + − = + −
≤
δ δ
L≤
 
 Normally, Benders’ decomposition would then be applied to the independent 
networks and the Benders’ subproblem, SP (See Taha (1975) for a detailed description of 
Benders’ approach).  Depending on the network model used, this could be carried out in a 
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straight forward fashion.  However, the structure present in the commonality model can 
be exploited.  At each iteration l of the Benders’ algorithm, a Benders’ cut of the form 
( )l lz ν ν≥ + −b δ y  
is added.  It has also been assumed the regularity conditions 
1     for all 
I
w
w W
y I C
∈
≤ ∈∑  
which could be added to SP.  Instead of taking the traditional Benders’ cut model for the 
minimum cost flow commonality problem, we formulate the multiple dimensional 
knapsack problem SP* with the current Benders’ cut as the objective and the optimal 
selection constraints (which are special ordered sets) defined over a feasible region.  This 
creates SP*, given as 
[ ]
min  ( )                                SP*
s.t.     1
          0,1
l T l
w
I C w I
w
y
y
ν ν δ
∈ ∈
+ −
≤
∈
∑∑
b y
 
Note for any iteration l, lν  yields the term lbν which is a constant, and therefore does not 
affect the optimization with respect to y (but is necessary for the test of optimality).  In 
addition, since this is a minimization problem, any objective function coefficients 
( )l− ν δ  that are positive will not contribute to the solution.  Therefore, the associated 
 wy  can be fixed at zero and what remains is a relatively smaller multi-dimensional 
knapsack problem (Martello and Toth, 1990).  The process continues by iterating 
between Benders’ problems—the independent layers with fixed y and SP* until the 
Benders’ optimality condition is met. 
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IV.  Methodology Demonstration and Analysis Results 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 In this chapter, the methodology developed in Chapter 3 is applied to a set of 
notional, layered networks with interdependent arcs.  The following steps are followed in 
this implementation: 
Step 1: The objective of the analysis is decided.  (In this case, minimum 
cost cut sets) 
Step 2: Notional networks are presented 
Step 3: Interdependencies are identified  
Step 4: Master and subproblem(s) are generated 
Step 5: The iterative procedure outlined in Chapter 3 is applied 
Step 6: Solution and analysis is presented 
4.2 Objective    
 
 Current models in the open literature generally treat infrastructure networks in 
isolation.  However, as infrastructures become more linked and inseparable, the need has 
arisen to incorporate common effects across multiple infrastructures.  In this thesis, given 
layered networks with interdependent arcs, the objective is to minimize the cost of the 
combined s-t cuts across all networks with individual and shared elements in the overall 
cut set as driven by model objective.  An s-t cut set is defined as a partition of the node 
set into two parts, with a node defined as s in one part, and a node defined as t in the 
other.  Each cut defines a set of arcs with one node in one partition, and the other node in 
the other partition.  A cost is associated with each of these arcs, and the goal to find the 
minimum cost set of arcs which determines this partition (Orlin, 27-28). 
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 For example, suppose the desired effect is to prevent military transportation and 
electricity flow to a specified island.  Further assume that only one bridge connects to the 
island, and all power lines are tied beneath the bridge.  One obvious solution is to bomb 
the bridge severing both the bridge itself and the power lines.  However, if the costs are 
too high (i.e. civilian casualties resulting from an inability to exit the island or decision to 
use the bridge in the future), then another form of attack would be more appropriate.   
Perhaps a less costly attack would be to hit the bridge with an EMP bomb, severing 
power, and physically bombing the military transportation hub on the island.  Currently, 
these two objectives are considered in isolation, but this method incorporates both.   
 Consider 
ki
π , the dual variable associated with the conservation of flow equation 
for node i of network k.  Let ijkν  be the dual variable associated with the capacity 
constraint of arc(i,j) of network k.  A minimum cut formulation for each of the k networks 
would be 
( , )
k
k
               min
. .    0 for all (i,j) A
        0 for all s,t N
         
k
k k
k k
ijk ijk
i j A
i j ijk
t s
c
s t
ν
π π ν
π π
∈
− + ≥ ∈
− ≥ ∈
∑
 
where ijkc is the flow capacity along arc(i,j) of network k.  Therefore, the objective 
function, ijk ijkc ν∑ , is the relative cost of cutting the flow of goods in network k.   
 To incorporate the interdependencies described in Chapter 3, let 
1,  if  chosen to cut commonality I
0, otherwise
I
w
w W
y
∈
= 

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The “cost,” w , then represent the relative cost of cutting the independent arcs associated 
with commonality I using option w.  The Commonality Model then becomes 
( , )
k
k
            min
. .    0 for all (i,j) A  and 
        1 for all s,t N and 
        1
         
k I
k k
k k
I
ijk ijk w w
k K i j A I C w W
i j ijk ijkw w
t s
w
I C w W
c y
s t y k K
k K
y
ν
π π ν δ
π π
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
+
− + + ≥ ∈ ∈
− ≥ ∈ ∈
≤
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑∑
 
where 
1 if arc( ) of network  is part of commonality I affected by option 
0 otherwise
I
ijkw
i, j k w W
δ
∈
= 

 
Note, however, this formulation does not need to be solved directly.  Since valuable 
information is gained from the dual variables of the Benders’ subproblem, when the y 
variables have been fixed, the dual of Benders subproblem is solved instead.  This dual is 
a maximum flow formulation given as 
 
T
( , )
:( , ) :( , )
* k
max                              Subproblem (dual)       
s.t.        0 for all 
            ,  for all (i,j) A ,  
k k
k I
k k
wt s w
k i j A i C w W
ijk jik
j i j A j j i A
ijk ijk ijk ijkw w
x y
x x k K
x c c y kδ
∈ ∈ ∈
∈ ∈
+
− = ∈
≤ − ∈ ∈
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
∑ ∑
   
,  ,  
            0   ( , ) ,
I
ijk
K w W I C
x for each i j A k K
∈ ∈
≥ ∈ ∈
 
4.3 Notional Networks 
 
 Figures 5-8 are graphical representations of four notional networks.  They may be 
power, communication, fuel and road ways, for example.  Nodes are numbered 
arbitrarily, but uniquely to avoid confusion.  Each network has an identified source (s) 
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and sink (t).  In addition, each arc has an associated cost of removal as illustrated in the 
following pictorial representations: 
 
     
 Figure 5.  Network 1     Figure 6.  Network 2 
 
 
 
    
 
 Figure 7.  Network 3     Figure 8.  Network 4 
 
4.4 Interdependencies 
 
 In this notional example, there are three sets of interdependent arcs.  The first set, 
y1, consists of the arcs x2,3,1, x9,13,2, and x24,23,4.  If cut as a set, the combined cost is 18.  
The second set, y2, set is x2,3,1 and x24,23,4.  The combined cost if cut in whole is 3.  Finally, 
the third, y3, consists of the arcs x5,4,1, x7,8,2, x17,16,3.  This cut set has a combined cost cut 
of 5.  Note that y1 and y2 represent two options against the same set of targets; y1 
represent removing all three elements, while y3 represents only removing two of the 
three.  For example, the three elements could be a highway, a power line, and a telephone 
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7- 
"X 
'lU ■m 
\ / \ / 
/\ 
i{^ \ /— ^* 
^5 
^n   /"     T Xia -TT \"" 
■1C ic 
\1S    TT   X.^«       ^„ /* 
X      I in     ^.      i'"     ^ 
3ioX_ 
10^ 
Afi 
4-5 
line, across a bridge.  A physical attack would sever all three links (y1), whereas another 
form of attack (as represented by y2), such as an EMP bomb, would only remove two of 
the three elements.   
 
Table 4.  Summary of Interdependencies. 
Element Associated Arcs Cost of Removal 
I=1 {(2,3),(9,13), (24,23)}  
w=1 {(2,3),(9,13), (24,23)} 18 
w=2 {(2,3), (24,23)} 3 
I=2 {(5,4),(7,8),(17,16)}  
w=1 {(5,4),(7,8),(17,16)} 5 
 
Note that W1=(w1,w2) and W2=(w1).   
 4.5 Benders Reformulation 
 
 Solving this problem via Benders requires the original minimum cost cut 
formulation (Base Model) to be reformulated into a “master” problem along with 
subproblems.  The master problem will only be a function of the binary variables which 
represent the interdependent arcs.   
T
( , ) ( , )
                                min   z                                                 Master Problem
. .    z (( ) )+  
              1
I k k
I
l l
w ijk ijkw w ijk ijk
i C w W k K i j A k K i j A
w
w W
s t x y c x
y
δ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
∈
≥ −
≤
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
              1
I C
r L
∈
≤ ≤
∑ ∑
 
 
 To solve the master problem, the only information needed from the subproblems 
is the dual vector associated with each constraint.  This presents two options for solving 
the subproblems.  First, the minimum cut can be determined for each network directly, 
then the dual values can be calculated and passed to the master problem.  The second 
option is to take the dual of the minimum cost cut network, solve the dual problem, and 
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pass the values directly back to the master problem.  The advantage of the second 
approach is that the dual of the minimum cost cut problem is the maximum flow problem.  
Although either method is equally correct, maximum flow codes are generally faster and 
more flexible.  Orlin discusses seven of the most common algorithms for solving 
maximum flow, along with their speed and flexibility (Orlin, 1993: 240).  For these 
reasons, the subproblems in this example have been solved as maximum flow problems, 
and flow over each arc is passed to the master problem.  Each subproblem will have the 
general form  
( , )
:( , ) :( , )
   
max                                   Subproblem k
s.t.        0
            *
            0   ( , )
            
k
k
T
ijk ijk w w
i j A w
ijk jik
j i j A j j i A
ijk ijk ijk ijkw w
ij
c x C y
x x
x c c y
x for each i j A
δ
∈
∈ ∈
+
− =
≤ −
≥ ∈
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
{0,1}wy ∈
 
 
Specifically, there are four subproblems (one for each network).   
For each network, an artificial arc is added which connects the sink and the 
source.  The links connecting this node to the source and sink are assigned an arbitrary 
high value so they will not be a limiting factor in the algorithm.  This formulation makes 
it easier to express the maximum flow though the network, by maximizing the flow 
though one of the artificial arcs.   
4.6 Algorithm 
 
As the first pass, assume that none of the interdependent sets are selected.  A 
closer look at the networks might reveal a better starting solution, but any starting point 
may be used so long as it is feasible.  If none of the interdependent arcs are cut as a 
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group, then the subproblems are maximum flow problems with unchanged capacities 
(i.e., the original network viewed independently).  The flow across an arc (of the dual 
problem) is the value needed to be passed to the master problem.  These problems are 
small enough that they were programmed and solved using Microsoft Excel 2002 with its 
built in solver.  For larger problems, a more robust network code would be more efficient.  
If the notional problems are solved independently then the following solutions are 
obtained: 
Table 5:  Subproblem Solution 
Network Cutset Common 
1 (4,6), (5,6)
2 (7,8),(7,9),(7,10)
3 (15,16)(15,17)(15,18)
4 (21,23)(22,25)(24,23)(24,25)
 
These values are passed to the master problem defined earlier. 
The master problem also needs the values associated with each of the interdependent arcs 
given in Table 4.  With these values, the following linear program results: 
2 3
                 min  z 
. .   z 13 2 90
                   +              1
                                    1
                               (0,1)
1
1 2
3
j
s t y y y
y y
 y
y
≥ − −
≤
≤
∈
 
This problem, solved for the y’s yields the following optimal solution: 
Table 6:  Master Problem Solution 
y1 y2 y3
0 1 1 
 
Since y2 and y3 are equal to 1, then the interdependent arcs represented by these variables 
are “cut.”  These arcs are removed indirectly by setting their upper bound capacity to 0, 
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effectively removing any possible flow across those arcs.  The subproblems are again 
solved with the flow capacities altered by the interdependent arcs represent by y2 and y3.  
With y2 and y3 equal to 1, the arcs corresponding to these have an upper bound capacity 
of 0.  In other words, with no capacity they have been effectively cut.  To illustrate, the 
arcs dependent on y1 and y2 have been deleted from the pictorial representation. 
               
Figure 9.  Network 1 Modified   Figure 10.  Network 2 Modified 
 
 
    
 
Figure 11.  Network 3 Modified   Figure 12.  Network 4 Modified 
 
With the new upper bound capacities on arc flow, the maximum flow 
subproblems are again solved.  The new solutions are as follows: 
Table 7:  Problem Solution 
Network Cutset Common 
1 (4,6), (5,6)  
2 (7,8),(7,9),(7,10) y3 
3 (15,16)(15,18),(17,16),(17,19),(17,18) y3 
4 (21,23)(22,25)(24,23)(24,25) y2 
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To calculate the lower bound on the optimal solution, the following equation from 
Benders’ approach is used: 
T
( , ) ( , )
z = (( ) )+  
I k k
l w ijk ijkw w ijk ijk
i C w W k K i j A k K i j A
x y c xδ
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
−∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
When the incumbent solutions are used, the lower bound is calculated to be 13.  The 
upper bound is found when the master problem is solved.  The master problem again 
results in the solution y1=0, y2=1, y3=1 with an upper bound of 13.  Following Benders’ 
approach, when the upper bound equals the lower bound, optimality conditions have been 
met.  Therefore, the solution with y1=0, y2=1, y3=1 is the optimal cut of the 
interdependent arcs.  With these values fixed, the problem simply becomes finding the 
minimum cost cut set for the four independent networks where the capacities of 
dependent arcs are modified by solution in Table 6.  This can either be found directly 
though a minimum cost cut algorithm, or by once again solving the maximum flow 
problem and finding the reduced costs.  Since the reduced costs represent the value of the 
primal variable, the arcs with a reduced cost of 1 are the arcs in the original formulation 
to be cut.   
                     
Figure 13.  Network 1 Cut   Figure 14.  Network 2 Cut 
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Figure 15.  Network 3 Cut    Figure 16.  Network 4 Cut 
 
To calculate the costs of the combined cuts, the cost (cikj and w )are summed over each 
arc which is removed.  If the sum of each individually cut arc is added to the sum of the 
two interdependent arcs cut, the sum cost is 123.   
4.7 Results and Analysis 
 
It is interesting to note that the optimal solution includes y2 and not y1 although y1 
includes more arcs; y2 is actually a subset of y1.  Because of the costs (desired effects), it 
is more efficient to cut two of the three arcs with a single interdependent arc instead of all 
three arcs with another interdependent arc.  This clearly illustrates potential options in 
selecting ways to interdict an arc (either individually or as a member of some 
interdependent set).   
For this small problem, the general formulation could have been easily been 
solved directly without the need for partitioning.  However, the power of the 
methodology lies in very large or complex networks with interdependent arcs.  A 
potentially large mixed integer program can be transformed into independent network 
problems and a pure 0-1 problem.  The special structure of these subproblems means 
solutions can be found efficiently.  Initial experiments indicate that the Benders’ 
10^ 
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algorithm converges to optimality very quickly.  If the interdependent effects can be 
specified, this methodology provides a framework for solving layered network problems. 
The methodology presented here fills a gap in the open literature about dealing 
with layered networks such as infrastructure networks.  The simple example could be 
scaled to solve much larger network problems.  It can also be applied to different types of 
network flow models.  For the minimum cost cut set problem presented, this approach 
shows a way to find the cut set across all networks simultaneously, not just across one 
layer of it.  In addition, this approach has many potential areas for improvement as 
discussed in the next chapter.   
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V.  Conclusion 
5.1 Overview 
 
This thesis developed and demonstrated a methodology to model multiple 
networks with interdependent arcs and decompose them into easily solved partitions.    
This methodology is demonstrated on four small notional networks, but the concept 
applies to networks regardless of size.  Therefore, even networks as large as 
infrastructure models can be analyzed.  Depending on the objective underlying network 
analysis, methods other than a cut-set approach can be used to take advantage of the 
structure of the network models.  For example, Out-of-Kilter algorithms can be used to 
take advantage of structure of the partitioned networks which only change in the upper 
limit in interdependent arcs.   
5.2 Research Results 
 
 This study showed that Benders’ decomposition can be used to partition multiple 
interdependent networks into independent networks with their interdependencies modeled 
separately.  Of course the power of this methodology is in its application to large, 
complex, layered networks.  Small networks such as those modeled here can be solved as 
a single problem.  However, infrastructure networks on a national level are very large and 
complex requiring one or more models for each layer of the infrastructure.  Infrastructure 
models have vastly different structures, methodologies, and requirements.  Combining or 
interfacing these models together is a daunting task.  This method does not replace those 
5-2 
tools, but provides a framework for modeling the crossover effects not explicitly modeled 
within the individual network models themselves.   
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
5.3.1 Benders’ Cuts 
 
Close inspection of the cuts generated by the Benders’ algorithm reveal potential 
to take advantage of special structures in the binary problem.  Every sample problem 
solved was solved with a single Benders’ cut.  The reason seems clear when all binary 
variables are mutually exclusive; i.e. all binary variables could be chosen simultaneously.  
In this case, an interdependent cut is chosen if its cost is less than the sum of the costs for 
all arcs it cuts.  Otherwise, if the interdependencies are not mutually exclusive, the 
Bender’s cut create a special ordered set from which those cuts are chosen which have 
the highest reduced cost.  In his textbook, William refers to this type of problem as a 
special ordered set (SOS), and he talks about the computational advantage of having 
these types of constraints (William, 1992: 179).   
5.3.2 Cascading effects 
 
One commonly cited example of cascading effects is in the power sector.  In a 
study conducted for the Department of Energy, eleven major cascading power failures 
were analyzed, most traced back to a single trigger.  For example, the 1965 blackout 
throughout the northeast was caused by a single relay switch in Ontario (Hauer, 1999:  5).  
Another study, conducted by Carreras, developed the flow chart in Figure 17 to show the 
formulation of the progression of blackouts.    
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Figure 17. Cascade Flowchart (Carreras, 2001:  2) 
 
The main cause of blackouts cannot be written into equations of a predictive code. 
Therefore, to understand the global dynamics of power system blackouts, the random 
character of the events that trigger them and the overall response of the system to such 
events need to be modeled.  If the system operates close to a "critical" point, some 
aspects of the response of the system to random perturbation may have a universal 
character (Carreras, 2002:  9). 
Cascading links contain four properties:  link direction, link type, definition of the 
origin vulnerability, definition of the repercussion function, and definition of the 
destination vulnerability (Robert, 2002: 3).   The link direction defines the direction a 
cascade may continue.  The link type is either direct or indirect.  Direct are either 
physical connections or predictable cause and effect relationships between components.  
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Indirect links are complex interactions not characterized by direct cause and effect 
relationships (Robert, 2002:  3). 
The vulnerability of the origin component is defined as “the possible 
consequences of failure as shown by the impacts on the operation of the component or on 
its ability to perform the role for which it is designed (Robert, 2002:  20).”  The 
vulnerability repercussion function defines how consequences connected to the origin 
component are propagated, modified, or transformed before reaching the destination 
component.  Lastly, the destination vulnerability consequences resulting from the origin 
component and then propagated are now considered and studied as direct causes that 
affect the vulnerability of the destination component.   
 
Figure 18.  Cascade links (Robert, 2002:  20)   
 
 A subset of cascading effects is time-dynamics.  Discussed in the paper Motter 
(2002) as “slow timescale evolution” and “fast timescale evolution.” 
5-5 
 
We have also considered the electrical power grid of the western United States.  
The degree distribution in this network is consistent with an exponential and is 
thus relatively homogeneous. The distribution of  loads, however, is more skewed 
than that displayed by semi-random networks with the same distribution of links, 
indicating that the power grid has structures that are not captured by these models. 
As a result, global cascades can be triggered by load-based intentional attacks but 
not by random or degree-based removal of nodes, as shown in Fig. 4. We see that 
the attack on a single node with large load reduces the largest connected 
component to less than a half of its initial size, even when the network is highly 
tolerant (Motter, 2002:  3). 
 
 
 
Figure 19.  Cascading Failures (Motter, 2002:  3) 
 
This type of data could be used to model the cumulative effects of attacking multiple 
targets.  For example, the synergy in this case is triggered with five specific targets are hit 
resulting in cascading power failures across thousands of points.  This would appear to be 
a critical area for future analysis.  In this thesis, interdependencies were modeled as 
binary variables affecting multiple arcs simultaneously.  However, nothing in the method 
requires simultaneity, and logic could be included to model the resulting effects when a 
threshold is met, triggering the cascade. 
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5.3.3 Weaponeering 
 
 The approach presented here assumed interactions and “cuts” had binary values.  
For example, if a binary variable assumed a value of one, then several arcs were 
effectively removed from its associated network.  One interpretation of this approach is 
that the binary variable represents a weapon capable of removing the identified set of 
arcs.   
 This approach could be modified slightly to directly include weaponeering, in 
addition to its targeting interpretation.  First, a probability of kill (pk) could be assigned to 
each variable associated with a weapon.  Second, the objective function could be 
modified to include maximizing the probability of kill subject to the other objectives 
(such as minimum cost cut set).  The result would be an algorithm for identifying both 
targets and weapons to attack these targets; two things which are currently done 
separately.  This is similar to the two stage stochastic programs looked at in the 
telecommunications industry (Lisser, 1999).  However, instead of stochastic demand, the 
probability of kill will be stochastic.   
5.3.4 Advanced Starting Basis 
 
The proposed methodology involves solving a pure network flow problem or 
problems repeatedly.  As the binary values change, the upper capacities of interdependent 
arcs are the only change in the networks from iteration to iteration.  For very large 
networks, re-solving the network problems may become computationally expensive, so 
we would like to take advantage of the fact that only the upper capacities of some of the 
arcs are changing.   
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Donohue and Birge (1995) consider a two-stage problem.  Similar to the 
methodology here, the second stage problems are pure minimum cost network flow 
problems where only the arc upper capacities change.  An approximation is made on the 
objective function in repeated iterations by finding an upper bound for the expected value 
of the network objective function.   
The method reformulates the objective function as a function of the upper 
capacities on the arcs and shows they are a non-increasing convex function with a 
property called convex marginal return functions.  These properties are then used to find 
an effective upper bound on the expected value of the network objective function.  This 
often significantly decreases the function evaluations needed, while still finding an 
effective bound.  (Donohue and Birge, 1995) 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
 The methodology presented in this research effort demonstrates a promising 
methodology for solving multiple layered networks with interdependencies.  This 
approach also has many promising areas of extension including weaponeering and 
cascading effects.  The potential computational savings of applying this methodology 
over solving the formulation directly as one large program is significant.   Given that the 
general methodology is applicable to any of the network models and structures, it has 
broad applications.  It should serve as the foundation for an array of interdependency 
analysis.  
Bib-1 
Bibliography 
Air Force Pamphlet 14-210.  USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide (U).  1 February 1998.   
 
Baumol, W. J. and T. Fabian, “Decomposition, pricing for decentralization and external 
economies,’ Management Science, Volume 11, Issue 1 (Sep. 1964), 1–32. 
 
Bellmore, M, G Bennington, and S Lubor. "A Network Isolation Algorithm." Naval 
Research Logistics Quarterly, 17 (1970): 461-469. 
 
Benders, J.  F. "Partitioning Procedures for Solving Mixed-Variables Programming 
Problems." Numerische Mathematik, 4 (1962): 238-252.   
 
Bennington, Gerald E. "Multi-Commodity Disconnecting Sets in Undirected Graphs by 
Node Partitioning." Diss. Johns Hopkins U, 1969. 
 
Bozek, Tom.  DoD Critical Infrastructure Protection  18th NDIA Security Division 
Symposium & Exhibition, 25-27 June 2002. 
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002security/bozek.pdf 
 
Carreras, B. A., Lynch, V. E., Dobson, I., Newman, D. E.. Critical points and transitions 
in an electric power transmission model for cascading failure blackouts. Chaos, 12, 
985 - 994, (2002). 
 
Carreras, B. A., Lynch, V. E., Dobson, I. & Newman, D. E. and Sachtjen, M.  Modeling 
Blackout Dynamics in Power Transmission Networks with Simple Structure   34th 
Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences ( HICSS-34)-Volume 
2, 25-27 Maui HI   03-06 January 2001.  
 
Christian, Shelley (Maj), and others. Information Warfare: An Opportunity For Modern 
Warfare. ACSC Research Paper, ACSC/DEC/020/95-05, Air Command and Staff 
College, Maxwell AFB AL. 1 May 1995. 
 
Dantzig, G. B. and P. Wolfe, The decomposition algorithm for linear programs, 
Econometrica, Volume 29, Issue 4 (Oct. 1961), 767–778. 
 
Deininger, R.A. 2000.  Constituents of Concern.  The Threat of Chemical and Biological 
Agents to Public Water Supply Systems.   Appendix F in Pipeline Net User’s 
Guide, SAIC. McLean VA. 
 
Donohue, C.J., Birge, J. R.  "An Upper Bound on the Network Recourse Function," 
Technical Report 95-5, Department of Industrial and Operations Engineering, 
University of Michigan, March 1995. 
 
Bib-2 
Ezell, Barry C. Risks of Cyber Attack to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition for 
Water Supply. Diss. U of Virginia, 1998. 01 Mar. 2003 
<http://www.riskinfo.com/cyberisk/Watersupply/SCADA-thesis.html>. 
 
Ezell B. C., Y.Y. Haimes, and J. L. Lambert.  “Risks of Cyber Attack to Water Utility 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems,” Military Operations Research 
Society, 6 (2), 2001. 
 
Fulghum, David A. "Electronic Bombs Darken Belgrade." Aviation Week & Space 
Technology 10 May 1999: 34-35. 
 
Geoffrion, A. M. "Generalized Benders Decomposition." Journal of Optimization Theory 
and Applications 10 (1972): 237-260.   
 
Griffith, Thomas E. Strategic Attack of National Electrical Systems. Diss. Air U, 1994. 
01 Mar. 2003 
<http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/Griffith/griffith.pdf>. 
 
Hauer, J. F., Dagel, J. E.  Consortium for electric reliability technology solutions, grid of 
the future: White paper on review of recent reliability issues and system events. 
U.S. Dept. of Energy. (1999).  http://certs.lbl.gov/pdf/CERTS-Reliability.pdf 
 
Hurst, G.R. Taking Down Telecommunications. Maxwell AFB AL: Air University Press, 
September 1994. 
 
Isenberg , David. Securing U.S. Water Supplies. 19 July 2002. 01 Mar. 2003 
<http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/water.cfm>. 
 
Lai, Ying-Cheng, and Adilson E. Motter. "Cascade-Based Attacks on Complex 
Networks." Physical Review E 66 (2002). 
 
Lisser A., Ouorou A., Vial J.-Ph. and Gondzio J., “Capacity planning under uncertain 
demand in telecommunications networks,” Logilab Technical Report, Department 
of Management Studies, University of Geneva, Switzerland, October, 1999. 
 
Martello, Silvano, Toth.  Knapsack Problems, John Wiley & Sans, New York, 1990. 
 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), Information 
Assurance Task Force (IATF).  Electric Power Information Assurance Risk 
Assessment.  March 1997. 
 
President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, Critical Foundations: 
Protecting America'sInfrastructures, Robert T. Marsh, Chairman (Washington, 
D.C.: GPO, October 1997), 01 March 2003.  
<http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/PCCIP_Report.pdf >   
Bib-3 
 
Polzin, Steven.  "Security Considerations in Transportation Planning:  A White Paper." 
Center for Urban Transportation Research for the Southeastern Transporation 
Center.  1 Mar. 2003 
<http://www.cutr.eng.usf.edu/pubs/Security%20paper%200402.doc>. 
 
Kelly, Terrence K., James P. Peerenboom, and Steven M. Rinaldi. "Identifying, 
Understanding, and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies." IEEE 
Control Systems Magazine, Dec. 2001: 11-25. 
 
Robert, Benoît. 2001a. A Method for the Study of Cascading Effects Within Lifeline 
Networks. Workshop on Mitigating the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to 
Catastrophic Failures, Alexandria VA (USA), September 10-11. 
http://www.ari.vt.edu/workshop/ 
 
Robert, Benoît, Sabourin, Jean-Pierre, Glaus, Mathias, Petit, Frédéric, and Senay, Marie- 
Hélène.  A New Structural Approach for the Study of Domino Effects Between Life 
Support Networks.  The Future of Disaster Risk: Building Safer Cities, December 
2002, http://www.proventionconsortium.org/files/conference_papers/robert.pdf 
 
Ryan, Julie.  The Infrastructure of the Protection of the Critical Infrastructure (1998).  01 
March 2003.  <http://www.julieryan.com/Infrastructure/IPdoc.html>.   
 
Sweeney, Dennis J., Murphy, Richard, A.  “A Method of Decomposition for Integer 
Programs,”  Operations Research, 27:  1128-1141 (1979). 
 
Taha, Hamdy A. Integer Programming: Theory, Applications, and Computations, 
New York NY: Academic Press, 1975. 
 
Uchida, Ted T.   Analysis of Effects-Based Operations – The Road Ahead to Doing 
Business Differently.  
 
Where Does My Drinking Water Come From? 26 Nov. 2002. Environmental Protection 
Agency. 01 Mar. 2003 <http://www.epa.gov/OGWDW/wot/wheredoes.html>. 
 
William, H.P. Model Solving in Mathematical Programming. Wiley, Chichester, (1992).  
 
Wilson, Jim. "E-Bomb." Popular Mechanics Sept. 2001. 1 Mar. 2003 
<http://popularmechanics.com/science/military/2001/9/e-bomb/print.phtml>. 
 
 
 
Vita-1 
Vita 
 
 
 
 Captain Kevin Kennedy entered undergraduate studies at the University of 
Kentucky in Lexington, Kentucky where he graduated with a Bachelor of Science degree 
in Mathematics and a Bachelor of Arts degree in Chemistry in May 1998.  He graduated 
with honors, Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta Pi, and Cum Laude.  He was commissioned 
through the Detachment 290 AFROTC at the University of Kentucky. 
 His first assignment was at Kirtland AFB where he served as Lethality Section 
Chief for the Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile.  In August 2001, he entered the 
Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology.  
Upon graduation, he will be assigned to the Air Force Logistics Management Agency at 
Gunter-Annex, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and 
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including 
suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, 
Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of 
information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
14-03-03 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
Sep 02 - Mar 03 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
AN ANALYSIS OF MULTIPLE LAYERED NETWORKS 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Kennedy, Kevin, T, Captain, USAF 
 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Street, Building 642, WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GOR/ENS/03-14 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 
 
 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
 N/A 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
              APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
14. ABSTRACT  
Current infrastructure network models of single functionality do not typically account for the interdependent nature of 
infrastructure networks.  Infrastructure networks are generally modeled individually, as an isolated network or with 
minimal recognition of interactions.  This research develops a methodology to model the individual infrastructure network 
types while explicitly modeling their interconnected effects.  The result is a formulation built with two sets of variables (the 
original set to model infrastructure characteristics and an additional set representing cuts of interdependent elements).  
This formulation is decomposed by variable type using Benders’ Partitioning and solved to optimality using a Benders’ 
Partitioning algorithm.   
 
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Large Scale Optimization, Layered Networks, Network Interdiction 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Richard F. Deckro 
a. REPORT 
 
U 
b. ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS PAGE 
 
U 
17. LIMITATION OF  
     ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER  
      OF 
      PAGES 
 
73 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-6565 x4325 (Richard.Deckro@afit.edu 
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18 
